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Abstract 
The paper adds to the literature on the barriers to innovation in two ways. First, we 
assess comparatively what mostly constrains firms’ ability to translate investment in 
innovation activity into new products and processes, whether it is mainly finance, as 
most of the literature would suggest, or whether it is mostly knowledge and market-
related aspects. Second, we suggest a method to correct for the sample selection bias 
that often affects empirical contributions to this scholarship. By filtering out firms that 
are not interested in innovation from those that struggle to engage in it, we obtain a 
relevant sample of potential innovators, which allows us to analyse the comparative 
effect of financial and non-financial barriers on innovation success. We find that 
demand-side factors, particularly concentrated market structure and lack of demand, 
are as important as financial constraints in determining firms’ innovation failures. This 
evidence redirects attention from financial to non-financial barriers by considering 
traditional demand, market structure and regulation factors involved in reduced firm 
innovation performance. The empirical analysis is based on an unbalanced panel of 
firm-level data from four waves of the UK Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
between 2002 and 2010 merged with data from the UK Business Structure Database.  
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1. Introduction  
Recent empirical innovation studies are devoting increasing attention to perception of 
the obstacles to innovation and their deterrent effect on firm propensity to engage in innovation 
activity, on the intensity of such engagement and the likelihood of innovating (for more detail 
see Section 2 and Baldwin and Lin, 2002; Galia and Legros, 2004; Canepa and Stoneman, 
2007; Segarra Blasco et al, 2008; Tiwari et al., 2008; Savignac, 2008; Iammarino et al., 2009; 
Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2014, among others).  
Assessing the actual impact of the obstacles to innovation on the rate of innovation 
failure/success has clear policy relevance, since removing or alleviating these barriers could 
enlarge the population of innovators and increase the innovation performance of current 
innovators (D’Este et al., 2008, 2012, 2014). A substantial number of works focus on the 
impact of financial obstacles. The emphasis on the financial conditions that enable innovation 
originates in the traditional cash-flow models (see Hall, 2002 for a review), which focus on the 
financial constraints to firms' R&D investments, and likely reflects the recent unfavourable 
financial downturn. Also, there is a rationale implied by an analytical focus on financial 
constraints. For instance, if it can be shown that firms do not innovate because they lack 
liquidity, struggle to access external financial sources or perceive innovation costs as excessive, 
it is relatively more straightforward for policy makers to alleviate these barriers by providing 
liquidity. This can take the form of additional subsidies, tax credits or channelling public funds 
to Venture Capital (VC) to increase (mainly R&D) innovation investments (Arqué-Castells, 
2012; Bertoni and Tykvová, 2015).   
In this paper, we argue that firms might encounter other types of obstacles and, despite 
access to or availability of financial liquidity to invest in innovation, might still perceive the 
conditions as not favouring innovation. These other constraints might include high barriers to 
market entry, lack of qualified personnel and lack of adequate information on technologies and 
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markets. All of these difficulties might produce persistent systemic failure to engage in 
innovation activities and/or to translate financial efforts into R&D and extend innovation 
activity into the introduction of new goods, services and processes.1 Thus, it is more important 
for policy to extend analysis to non-financial obstacles. This will provide evidence on whether 
firms do not innovate due to the lack of appropriate information on technologies and market, 
lack of adequate skills or, and most likely during a financial downturn, because of sluggish 
destinations markets with low levels of demand, or markets dominated by established firms.2  
This paper adds to the literature on barriers to innovation in two main respects. First, 
we build on and extend D’Este et al. (2008, 2012), who distinguish between ‘deterring’ and 
‘revealed’ barriers,3 by assessing the impact of revealed barriers on the translation of 
innovation activity into actual innovation output.4,5 We take care to distinguish financial and 
non-financial obstacles and, unlike Tiwari et al. (2008) and Blanchard et al. (2013), we provide 
comparative evidence on whether access to knowledge, a concentrated market structure, 
uncertain demand or regulation have comparable or more substantial effects than finance on 
constraining firms’ ability to translate innovation investments into new outputs. 
Second, we build on other contributions (Savignac, 2008; Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2014; 
as well as D’Este et al., 2008, 2012), and suggest a method to correct for the sample selection 
bias that usually characterises empirical contributions to this scholarship, which has led to the 
                                                 
1 In what follows, we use innovative products to refer to innovative goods and innovative services. 
2 Recent micro and macro level empirical evidence on the effects of the economic downturn on innovation 
investments by firms and countries, is provided in Archibugi and Filippetti, 2011; Archibugi et al., 2012). 
3 The distinction is based on the relation between the degree of engagement in innovation activity and the 
perceived importance of the constraints to innovation. Deterring barriers prevent firms from engaging at all in 
innovation activities, while revealed barriers are those barriers that are experienced “in the making” of innovation, 
which reflect the firm's awareness of them based on their engagement in innovation inputs.  
4 It is important here to highlight (see also Section 3) that in the innovation-survey literature the term ‘innovation 
active’ describes the degree to which firms devote financial effort to innovation (innovative inputs). It does not 
mean that the firm necessarily has introduced a new product or process as a consequence of its innovation 
investment. This distinction is central to our argument and often is blurred in the traditional literature on financing 
constraints (see Section 2.1).  
5 For the purpose of this paper, we do not focus on the degree of novelty of the product and therefore do not 
distinguish between goods or service new to the firm versus new to the market. Rather, we adopt a more 
conservative choice of focusing on the simple introduction of a product/process new to the firms or new to the 
market.  
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counterintuitive finding of a positive relation between intensity of innovation investments and 
perception of the obstacles to innovation (Mohnen and Rosa, 2000; Baldwin and Lin, 2002). 
We use a ‘relevant sample of potential innovators’, which we would suggest should represent 
the working sample of any CIS-based empirical contributions to the literature on barriers to 
innovation. Our sample is obtained by filtering out firms not willing to innovate and, therefore, 
which do not engage in any innovation activity for other reasons than the obstacles to this 
activity, from those that struggle to engage in innovation activity. 
We draw on the UK CIS4, 5, 6 and 7 waves, which we merge with UK Business 
Structure data. Our longitudinal data provide descriptive evidence of whether there is a degree 
of persistence over time of “not innovation oriented”, “failed innovator” or “innovator” status. 
This information, coupled with evidence on the type of barrier most likely to affect firms’ 
innovation status, is of primary importance for policy making since it identifies the relevant 
population to which interventions should be targeted.6  
Our findings show that traditional demand and market structure factors are as important 
as financial constraints for determining firms’ innovation failure. While we find no significant 
evidence that firms attempting to innovate are constrained by lack of knowledge of 
technologies, we find that regulatory aspects can affect innovation performance, although to a 
lesser extent than financial constraints.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the barriers to 
innovation and highlights the econometric issues. Section 3 describes the data, how our sample 
was identified, and the econometric strategy applied. Section 4 discusses the results and points 
                                                 
6 For instance, policy makers might prioritize enlarging the population of innovation-active firms (innovation-
widening) by removing or alleviating the obstacles to engagement in innovation activity, or strengthening the 
innovation capacity of the existing population of innovation-active firms (innovation-deepening) by removing or 
alleviating the obstacles to successful completion of innovation projects and adequate return from innovation 
investments. We will discuss this in the conclusion. 
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to the main contributions made by this analysis to the existing literature. Section 5 summarises 
the evidence and discusses some implications for innovation policy.  
 
2. Financial and non-financial barriers to innovation 
 
The literature on firms’ innovation failure is relatively smaller than the core innovation 
literature, which focuses on the determinants of innovation success. This is somewhat puzzling, 
given the policy relevance of identifying and reducing the barriers to the firm's decision to 
spend on innovation activity and complete successful innovation projects. It would be short-
sighted to suggest that identifying the success factors would also reveal what determines 
innovation failure. For instance, if large firms are more likely to introduce innovations, this 
does not mean that all small firms will find it difficult to be successful. Therefore, it is important 
to identify the types of hindrances firms encounter at different phases in the innovation cycle, 
that is, during the decision to innovate, engagement in innovation activity and introduction of 
a new product/process. We review a few of the contributions that deal with these issues, 
distinguishing between financial and non-financial obstacles.  
2.1 Financing constraints and R&D investments 
The majority of the work on the direct effect of the barriers to innovation, including 
innovation-related expenditure (inputs) and the introduction of innovation outputs, focus on 
(external) financing constraints on the firm's cash flow, which deter R&D investment (for a 
review, see Schiantarelli, 1996 and Hall, 2002; Bond et al., 1999 and Hottenrott and Peters, 
2012). These contributions focus on the effect of financial constraints on the risk of sub-optimal 
and welfare-reducing investment. In particular, they are concerned with the high uncertainty, 
asymmetries and market complexity linked specifically to the financial returns on R&D 
investment and the ability to attract external funding. Most studies test the presence of 
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financing constraints indirectly, by looking at the sensitivity of R&D investments to changes 
in cash flow (e.g., Hall, 2008). However, some (Canepa and Stoneman, 2007; Savignac, 2008; 
Hottenrott and Peters, 2012) employ innovation surveys to access direct information on firms' 
perceptions of financing constraints. The empirical findings tend to confirm that encountering 
financial constraints significantly reduces the likelihood that firms will engage in innovation 
activity (Savignac, 2008) and that this pattern is more pronounced in small firms and in high-
tech sectors (Canepa and Stoneman, 2007). Drawing on an ideal test to identify the role of 
financing constraints proposed by Hall (2008),7 Hottenrott and Peters (2012) find that, in the 
context of equal internal availability of funds, firms with higher levels of innovation 
capabilities are more likely to face financial constraints to innovation.  
However, the findings in the literature on finance and innovation and, particularly, the 
strand on Venture Capital (VC) are more consistent. For instance, Arqué-Castells (2012: 897) 
shows that in the case of Spain, 'VCs serve as a critical catalyst to moving inventions from the 
laboratory to the factory and on to consumers'. VCs usually prefer to invest in firms with higher 
innovation potential, although not in basic research or at the beginning of the innovation cycle, 
confirming that potentially highly innovative firms are more in need of external finance. Other 
studies show that VC certification, which signals to the market the goodness of the innovation 
investment, significantly affects recurrent resort to venture capital financing (Bertoni et al., 
2015). Overall, this literature finds that external finance is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition to ensure successful innovation (Casamatta, 2003). However, none of these 
contributions explicitly distinguish the role of finance in the context of innovation constraints, 
or attempt to account for the relative importance of financial and non-financial obstacles.  
                                                 
7 Rather than using traditional innovation survey data for perception of the obstacles to innovation, Hall (2008) 
and Hottenrott and Peters (2012) conduct an ideal experiment by providing firms with exogenous extra cash, and 
observe whether they decide to spend it on innovation projects. The presence of (external) financing constraints 
is detected by the decision to devote extra cash to otherwise unfunded innovation projects.  
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Some more recent work relies on data from innovation surveys to assess the relationship 
between the degree of engagement in innovation activity (input) and the perception of financial 
and non-financial constraints. 
2.2 Experiencing barriers, engaging in innovation activity, and the propensity to 
innovate: CIS evidence 
CIS data allow analysis of the role of obstacles to innovation to be extended in two 
main directions. First, they provide a direct indicator of the perception of the obstacles to 
innovation beyond only financial barriers. These obstacles include knowledge and information-
related barriers, market structure, demand and regulation.8 Second, it allows investigation of 
whether these barriers affect firm behaviour at different stages in the innovation cycle including 
making the decision to innovate, engaging in innovation activity and successful introduction 
of a new product/process.  
The CIS-based literature in this field explores the complementarities between different 
innovation obstacles (Galia and Legros 2004; Mohnen and Röller, 2005), the association 
between the factors affecting perception of the importance of different barriers and innovation 
engagement (Baldwin and Lin, 2002; Iammarino et al., 2009; D’Este et al., 2012), and the 
impact of (mainly financial) obstacles to innovation (Tourigny and Le, 2004; Savignac, 2008; 
Tiwari et al., 2008; Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2014; Blanchard et al., 2013).  
This highlights two important issues. First, most of the empirical findings show a 
positive relationship between engagement in innovation and perception of barriers. To try to 
make sense of this evidence, Savignac (2008) and D’Este et al., (2008) identify sources of 
potential bias that might explain the positive spurious correlation between innovation intensity 
and perception of obstacles, and the counter-intuitive results emerging from these analyses. 
                                                 
8 A detailed description of the CIS questions on barriers is provided in Appendix Table A1.  
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These sources of bias include the presence of heterogeneous unobserved firm specific factors 
and the simultaneous spending for innovation projects and facing obstacles to innovation. 
There is also a particular source of bias, which is caused by the design of the CIS questionnaire 
and is linked to inappropriate selection of a relevant sample. No distinction is made between 
firms willing or not willing (or needing) to innovate (see Savignac, 2008 and D’Este et al., 
2008, 2012).  
Although the CIS focuses mainly on ‘innovation-related’ factors, it also gathers 
information on non-innovative firms. However, all of the firms responding to the survey are 
required to respond to the questions on the obstacles to innovation (see Appendix Tables A1 
and A2). Firms might decide that they do not need to innovate due to lack of interest or because 
of recent innovation activity, thus, in principle, they will not experience obstacles to innovation. 
However, firms might also decide that they need or are willing to innovate and invest in 
innovation  (potential innovators), but fail to introduce a new product/process (failed 
innovators). In other cases, the firm might decide to innovate and devote financial resources to 
innovation activity, and manage to introduce a new output (innovators).9  
Some of the most recent contributions selected their samples (of firms willing to 
innovate and potentially failed by the presence of obstacles) more carefully, and obtain the 
expected signs (Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2014; Blanchard et al., 2013).  
Most of this work focuses on the financial constraints to innovation and treat non-
financial constraints as controls (Tiwari et al., 2008; Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2014; Blanchard 
et al., 2013). Despite acknowledging the fundamental – possibly exacerbating – effect of other 
types of obstacles, indirectly on financing difficulties and directly on the firm's innovation 
                                                 
9  These alternative scenarios are depicted in Figure 1.  
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intensity, none of these contributions provides a detailed, comparative picture of other systemic 
sources of innovation failure.10  
The present work provides a comparative assessment of the effect of the perception of 
different types of barriers on the propensity to innovate. It tries to rebalance the role of market 
structure, demand and knowledge vis à vis finance only, on limiting the ability of firms – 
including those with adequate finance – to complete innovation successfully. In our view, an 
evidence-based distinction between the characteristics of those firms not willing to innovate 
and those firms willing to innovate, and the effect on innovation and failure to introduce new 
products, are crucial for targeted policy interventions.   
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Dataset and identification of the relevant sample 
 
The empirical analysis is based on firm-level data from four waves of the UK 
Community Innovation Survey (UKIS) for the periods 2002-2004 (UKIS 4), 2004-2006 (UKIS 
5), 2006-2008 (UKIS 6) and 2008-2010 (UKIS 7). Traditionally, the UKIS is based on a 
stratified random sample (namely sector, region and size-band) drawn from the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR), and is representative, 
at the sector and firm size levels, of the entire population of UK firms with more than 10 
employees.  
The dataset comprises a set of general information (main industry of affiliation, 
turnover, employment, founding year)11 and a (much larger) set of innovation variables 
                                                 
10 Exceptions are Iammarino et al., 2008 and D’Este et al., 2012, which, however, both focus on the factors 
affecting the perception of obstacles, rather than their impact on innovation performance.  
11 This additional information was drawn from the UK Business Structure Database. 
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measuring the firms’ engagement in innovation activity, economic and non-economic 
measures of the effects of innovation, subjective evaluations of factors hampering or fostering 
innovation, participation in cooperative innovation activities and some complementary 
innovation activities such as organisational change and marketing.12  
The survey sampled 28,000 UK enterprises in each wave with a relatively high response 
rate (58% for UKIS 4, 53% for UKIS 5, 51% for UKIS 6 and 50% for UKIS 7) that leads to a 
whole sample of 59,940 observations (40,709 firms observed for 1 up to 4 years).13  
After excluding those firms operating in the primary and construction sectors (5,695 
firm-year observations) and those with missing values in the variables used for our analysis 
(16,513 firm-year observations), we are left with a pooled sample of 37,732 firm-year 
observations.  
In line with the discussion in the previous section and Figure 1, we filter out firms that 
are not willing to innovate, and focus on the relevant sample of potential innovators. That is, 
we exclude firms that, by inference, can be defined as not innovation oriented by filtering out 
9,059 firm-year observations referring to firms that by deliberate choice had not introduced a 
product and/or process innovation and were not in process of doing so (see Appendix Table 
A3). These are also firms that that did not experience any barrier to innovation (i.e., had not 
experienced any of the 10 obstacles included in the question on barriers, see Appendix Table 
A1) regardless of whether they had invested or not in any innovation activities.14 This resulted 
in a final sample of 28,673 firm-year observations (the “relevant sample”) of so-called potential 
                                                 
12 Information on group belonging and public financial support for innovation is not available due to slight changes 
to the questionnaire designs across the 4 surveys.  
13 Since CIS data are collected retrospectively (innovating over the past three years), the 9 years period pertaining 
to the four different surveys allows us to have data just for four time periods.  
14 A specific question in the CIS questionnaire refers to the willingness/not willingness to innovate (see table A2). 
Although this could have straightforwardly been used to select out the not-innovation oriented firms, the variables 
referred to this question are affected both by inconsistency in the response patterns (i.e. firms that have answered 
to the question but that have also reported to have introduced product or process innovations) and the presence of 
several missing values (no answer). We have therefore chose to select out the “not-innovation oriented” firms 
according to the (more consistent) strategy illustrated here.  
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innovators, that is, firms willing to innovate. The willingness to innovate is measured as having 
introduced a new product/process (i.e., positive response to at least one of the three questions 
in Appendix Table A3) or engaged in innovation activity (investment) while also experiencing 
at least one of the barriers to innovation. 
Within the sample of potential innovators, we can distinguish firms (15,576 firm-year 
observations) that had embarked on or were engaged in an ongoing innovation project, or had 
introduced a new or significantly improved product or process, regardless of whether they had 
experienced (or not) any barriers to innovation (innovators) from those firms (13,097 firm-year 
observations) that had not managed to translate innovation inputs into a new marketable 
product/process (failed innovators). 
Figure 1 depicts possible scenarios based on the firm’s innovation decision process and 
the role played by the obstacles to innovation; it shows the sample size of each group of firms. 
 
< INSERT FIGURE 1 > 
 
Table 1 presents the composition of the panel, distinguishing between the total and the 
relevant sample. About 67% of the 25,997 firms included in the final sample are observed for 
just one period; around 22% are observed for two periods; and a negligible percentage of firms 
(1.5%) are observed for the entire four-year reference period. No particular differences are 
observed between the two panels (total and relevant samples) for the percentage of firms 
observed each year. 
< INSERT TABLE 1 > 
3.2 Econometric strategy and variables    
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We analyse the impact of different types of obstacles to innovation on the firm’s 
propensity to innovate.15 In doing so we consider the following equation: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐼 [𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿
′𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 > 0]                                                                                 (1) 
 
where 𝐼[∙] is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the argument in brackets is true, and 
zero otherwise, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the firm 𝑖 is innovative. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a 
set of explanatory variables including the ‘traditional’ determinants of the firm’s decision to 
innovate, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a vector of variables identifying different obstacles to innovation, 𝑐 is the usual 
constant term and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term. 
Among the traditional determinants of innovation (𝑋𝑖𝑡), we first consider firm size, 
measured as the natural logarithm of total number of the firm's employees. As pointed out by 
Schumpeter (1942) and emphasised later by several authors, larger firms are more likely to 
engage in innovation activity because they are less likely to be affected by liquidity constraints 
(they enjoy easier access to external finance, larger internal funds) and can exploit economies 
of scale (see Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Mairesse and Mohnen, 2002).  
The firm's propensity to innovate is affected also by the market structure and market 
competitiveness. Thus, a firm operating in an international context should be more likely to 
engage in innovation activity because of the high level of competition characterising the global 
arena (e.g., Archibugi and Iammarino, 1999; Narula and Zanfei, 2003). Accordingly, we use a 
binary indicator of international competition (Exporter), which equals 1 if the firm’s most 
significant export market is international, and 0 otherwise.    
                                                 
15 Recall that we are interested in innovation outputs (i.e. new introduced or developed product or process) rather 
than inputs (i.e. investment activities).  
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As suggested by Piva and Vivarelli (2009), higher skilled human resources can be 
related to a higher propensity to innovate. Skilled compared to unskilled workers are more able 
to deal with complexity and are more successful at exploiting innovative ideas (Song et al., 
2003). Therefore, we include a variable to proxy for the proportion of the firm's high skilled 
employees (engineers and graduates) (higher education). 
The occurrence of other forms of innovation and, particularly those involving changes 
to the firm's organisational structure, have been shown to complement more traditional sources 
of innovation (see Bresnahan et al., 2002; Hitt and Brynjolfsson, 2002). Thus, we expect a 
positive impact of the binary variable organisation, which measures the effect of the 
implementation of major changes to the firm's organisational structure on the firm’s probability 
to engage in innovation. 
We also use firm age (in natural logarithm) to control for age related effects. We do not 
hypothesise about the possible effect of firm age on the probability to innovate because there 
is no consensus on this in the literature. Keppler (1996) proposes a theoretical model which 
shows that the number of innovations per firm at a given moment is higher, the younger the 
firm. This should imply a negative relationship between firm age and its probability of 
innovating. However, Galande and De la Fuente (2003) point out that firm age can also proxy 
for the firm’s knowledge and experience accumulated over time and, consequently, should be 
positively related to innovation. In order to check for possible nonlinearity effects, and in line 
with some recent contributions (Bertoni and Tykvovà, 2015), we also consider the squared 
values of this variable. 
We consider the variable innovative expenditure (turn) to measure the firm’s total 
innovation expenditure normalised by total turnover. 
In addition, all the specifications include time dummies to take account of possible 
business cycle effects, and regional dummies in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
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across different UK regions. Finally, we control for the specific sector and the technological 
factors affecting the firm’s propensity to introduce a new product/process, by including a 
complete set of industry dummies. Appendix Tables A4 and A5 present the sectoral 
composition and average employment for the total sample, and the sub-samples of potential 
innovators, failed innovators, innovators and non-innovation oriented firms. From a descriptive 
point of view, no particular differences emerge among the different groups of firms.    
The vector 𝑍𝑖𝑡 in equation (1) includes four different dummies variables, for those firms 
facing at least one within the following groups of obstacle to innovation: 1) financial obstacles; 
2) knowledge obstacles; 3) market obstacles; and 4) regulatory obstacles (see Appendix Table 
A6 for a detailed description of the variables employed in the empirical analyses and their 
definition) 16.  
As mentioned in Section 2, in the contributions to the work on barriers the expected 
signs are not always confirmed. However, D’Este et al. (2014) find that human capital has a 
significant role in attenuating barriers related to skills shortages and market uncertainties. In 
line with some empirical contributions (Cainelli et al., 2006; Piva and Vivarelli, 2007; García-
Quevedo et al., 2016) we would expect also that a perception of a reasonable degree of certainty 
on customers’ responses to new products, and a dominant position in the market would reduce 
the market-related barriers to the propensity to innovate. Also, based on the findings in 
Iammarino et al., (2009) and D’Este et al. (2008, 2012) we expect that the need to meet both 
national and European regulation leads to a lower propensity to innovate. 
                                                 
16 Appendix Table A1 shows that the respondents to the UKIS questionnaire are asked about their perception of 
the degree of importance (low, medium, high) of each barrier. Although this additional information would allow 
more detailed analysis, the self-reported nature of the responses casts doubt on their reliability. However, as a 
robustness check, we estimate equation (1) considering two alternative definitions of the innovation obstacles 
variables (perception of high, high-medium degree of importance). The results, which are available upon request, 
are consistent with those discussed in Section 4.4. Also, we have chosen to focus on the four binary variables that 
identify those firms that have experienced at least one within each of the four groups of obstacles to innovation in 
the form of financial, knowledge, market and regulation. The appropriateness of this choice is confirmed by the 
results (available upon request) of a polychoric factor analysis performed on the single barriers.  
16 
3.3 Descriptive evidence    
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the descriptive statistics for the variables of interest computed 
according to the different categories of firms. 
 < INSERT TABLE 2 > 
< INSERT TABLE 3 > 
Table 2 shows that firm expenditures on innovation for the group of innovators is more 
than double the level of expenditure on innovation reported by the group of failed innovators.17 
There are also notable differences among the firm categories for the other variables of interest. 
Innovator firms are more oriented to export, more prone to implement organizational changes 
and hire more highly educated people than the categories failed and non-innovation oriented 
firms. The values of an ANOVA test (reported in Table 4) confirm the statistical significance 
of these differences among the three groups of firms. 
    < INSERT TABLE 4> 
The lower part of Table 2 shows that the percentage of firms that have experienced 
obstacles to innovation is always high, with values ranging from 64% for regulatory obstacles, 
to 87% for financial obstacles. In addition, the percentage of firms experiencing different 
obstacles to innovation differs significantly between the groups of innovators and failed 
                                                 
17 Due to the specific design of the UKIS questionnaire, non-innovative firms are also required to respond to the 
innovation inputs questions. Therefore, some of the non-innovation oriented firms in our sample show positive 
expenditure on innovation activity (see also fn. 3).  
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innovators, for all the obstacles items except market obstacles (see Table 5 which presents the 
results for the standard errors and level of significance of a mean comparison t-test).  
    < INSERT TABLE 5> 
Table 2 shows also that, for knowledge and market obstacles, on average, the group of 
failed innovators experiences slightly lower barriers to innovation than the group of innovators. 
This initially puzzling result may be related to the relevant characterisation, originally proposed 
by D’Este et al. (2012), according to which obstacles to innovation can have two distinct types 
of effect on firms' innovation behaviour, namely a deterring or a revealed effect. More 
specifically, the different obstacles to innovation, apart from preventing the firm from engaging 
in innovation (deterring effect), might also significantly slow the firm's innovation process 
(revealed effect). Accordingly, there is no a priori reason to expect that the occurrence of 
obstacles to innovation is more frequent among failed innovators than innovators.    
4. Econometric results 
 
In this section we provide multivariate evidence of the effect of the different obstacles 
to innovation on the firm’s propensity to introduce innovative products and/or processes. We 
estimate equation 1 by applying a pooled probit model with standard errors clustered at firm 
level.18  
Table 6 reports the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on our dependent 
variable. We show the importance of appropriately defining the relevant sample, and correcting 
for potential selection bias caused by the specific design of the CIS questionnaire. We estimate 
                                                 
18 Although our dataset would allow application of panel data estimation methods, the particular nature of these 
data led to our choice to use pooled data and to estimate a simple probit model with clustered standard errors. 
Table 1 shows that the longitudinal dimension of our data is limited, with almost 70% of our sample observed in 
only 1 year, and most of the other 30% in only 2 years. As a robustness check, we repeated the analysis by applying 
a random effects probit model. The results of the estimations, are available upon request and are largely in line 
with those reported in Table 6.  
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the model considering both the relevant sample (columns 1-3) and the whole sample (columns 
4-6). We test the robustness of our results by considering three different specifications. First, 
we estimate a baseline model which includes the four obstacles variables and the main control 
variables (columns 1 and 4), and then consider two additional models (columns 2 and 3) with 
the variables ln(Age squared) and Innovation exp. (turn) added successively. 
In the estimation results obtained considering the relevant sample (columns 1-3), we 
notice that, in three out of four cases, the estimated coefficients of the obstacles variables show 
a highly significant hindering effect on the firm's propensity to be an innovator. Knowledge 
obstacles is the only category that does not show a significant relationship with the dependent 
variable. However, the results in column 1 suggest that the presence of financial obstacles 
significantly reduces the firm’s probability to translate innovative efforts into innovation output 
by 7%. Similarly, firms experiencing market-related obstacles are 4.7% less likely to introduce 
any kind of innovative product or process, than those firms that do not experience this 
impediment. Finally, regulatory barriers significantly reduce the firm’s propensity to introduce 
an innovative product and/or process, by 2.6%; these results are robust across different 
specifications (see Table 6 columns 2 and 3).  
To ascertain whether or not the observed differences in the magnitude of the marginal 
effects of these three obstacles variables are statistically significant, we perform a series of 
Wald tests, which consider the marginal effects reported in Table 6 column 1. The results of 
the tests do not suggest any statistically significant differences between financial and market 
related factors (p-value of the Wald test: 0.125) or between market related obstacles and 
regulatory obstacles (Wald test p-value is 0.14). However, the impact of financial obstacles on 
firms' propensity to introduce an innovative product and/or process appears to be significantly 
higher than the impact of regulation (Wald test p-value: 0.001). 
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Overall, this evidence calls for a more extended empirical analysis of the role of non-
financial barriers since lack of finance does not seem to be the only problem suffered by failed 
innovators. Other systemic barriers to innovative performance emerge as being equally 
important for affecting firm behaviour and innovation success, although they are more difficult 
to analyse. 
The other regressors show the expected signs for all the traditional determinants of 
innovation activities. Specifically, larger firms, firms that introduced organisational changes 
and are more oriented to international markets, are more likely to translate their innovative 
efforts into innovative outputs. Also, as expected, those firms with more highly qualified staff, 
and firms reporting more intensive innovative efforts, seem more likely to introduce 
innovations to the market (see column 3). Although not all of the literature agrees, our results 
seem to support those studies that find that younger firms are more likely than their mature 
counterparts to develop innovative products and/or processes, although the variable age turns 
out to be insignificant when we consider its squared value (see Table 6 column 2).  
Finally, the p-values of the Wald tests reported in the lower part of Table 6 confirm the 
importance of controlling for sectoral, geographic and time fixed effects. Indeed, the null 
hypothesis that the regional, sectoral and time dummies are jointly equal to zero is always 
rejected.  
It is worth a brief comment on the results reported in Table 6 columns 4-6, for the total 
sample, which includes the 9,059 firm-year observations referring to the sample of non-
innovation oriented firms. It can be seen that the signs and the coefficients of the different 
obstacles to innovation are in line with the counterintuitive findings in most of the studies 
mentioned in Section 2.2. Indeed, all the obstacles variables have a positive and highly 
significant impact on the firm’s propensity to innovate. This evidence demonstrates the 
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importance of correcting for the selection bias in CIS-based studies of the barriers to 
innovation.  
< INSERT TABLE 6 > 
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications  
 
This paper adds to the conceptual and empirical literature on the barriers to innovation 
and provides information for policy makers by presenting an in-depth, unbiased picture of the 
main financial and non-financial barriers to firms’ abilities to translate innovation efforts 
(inputs) into successful innovations (outputs).  
We add to the work of Savignac (2008) and D’Este et al. (2008, 2012) and identify a 
‘relevant sample’ of potential innovators vis à vis non-innovation oriented firms, on the basis 
of their self-declarations about their willingness to innovate. We claim and demonstrate 
empirically that, in the context of assessing the effect of the barriers to innovation, it is 
important to filter out those firms that are not willing or do not need to innovate (non-innovation 
oriented) from those that choose to devote financial resources to innovation, but do not manage 
to produce an innovation (failed innovators) due to the barriers to innovation.  
We confirmed our a-priori classification by testing the effect of potential (which engage 
in at least one innovative activity) innovators’ perception of the relevance of different obstacles 
to innovation on their propensity to innovate. Specifically, we predicted and test the conjecture 
that non-financial (market structure, demand, knowledge) obstacles to innovation are at least 
as important as financial barriers for affecting innovation propensity.  
We found that market related barriers, such as a concentrated market structure and lack 
of or sluggish demand from consumers, are as important hindrances for firms as financial 
constraints, which are emphasised in most of the traditional literature using cash-flow models. 
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We found also that regulation significantly and negatively constrains firms' innovation 
propensity. In comparative terms, we found support for our initial conjecture that financial 
constraints are as important as market obstacles for affecting innovation (performance) success, 
and are more important than regulatory factors.  
This evidence is consistent with most of the literature on finance and innovation, for 
instance, studies of venture capital and innovation, which find that venture capital investments 
and the frequency with which firms use this type of selective and competitive external financial 
resource, are generally associated to high innovation potential (Casamatta, 2003; Arqué-
Castells, 2012; Bertoni et al., 2015). However, the presence of adequate demand for innovative 
product is not necessarily guaranteed.  
Although we focus on a specific country and use self-reported responses from firms, 
our results allow us to conclude that it is important for policy aimed at supporting innovation, 
to focus on both increasing liquidity via R&D tax credits and similar tools, and a policy 
platform that includes competition and demand-related instruments. The current economic 
downturn, which has increased unemployment and resulted in poor demand dynamics, has 
reduced the  incentives for firms to invest in innovation (for a discussion, see Archibugi and 
Filippetti, 2011).  
The type of analysis conducted here and the data at our disposal do not allow more than 
these general comments on the economic downturn. Further corroboration of our findings will 
require a more in depth analysis of targeted demand-side innovation policy and a rebalancing 
of the supply-bias in innovation policy, with a greater focus on the demand-side (Edler and 
Georghiou, 2007). There has been some interest in demand-side innovation policy (OECD, 
2011; see also Uyarra, 2013; Uyarra et al., 2014). However, most of this literature is interested 
in the role and efficacy of public procurement, beyond traditional supply-side policies such as 
R&D tax credits and standards. Some scholars have suggested user-led innovation initiatives, 
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lead-market policies and the role of intermediates to ensure the success of public procurement 
(Uyarra et al., 2014; Edler and Yeow, 2016). There seems to be a consensus on the positive 
role of public procurement for overcoming systemic failures and creating a critical mass of 
selective demand for innovation, which, in some contexts, stimulates firms’ efforts (Uyarra et 
al., 2014). Our findings support the need for carefully articulated use of public procurement of 
innovation.  
Regulation constraints, which we found significantly affecting the propensity to 
innovate although less so than financial constraints, should be considered as a potential area 
for intervention. However, more in depth investigation of the nature of these types of 
constraints is required and, possibly, from a qualitative perspective. The effect of regulation 
barriers might be sector-specific, with firms operating in highly regulated markets (i.e. 
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology) perceiving regulation as a constraint, but in some cases also 
an incentive to innovate and catch up to the technological frontier. Research on the effects of 
regulation would be an interesting area for future research, although CIS data on this area are 
usually not comparable across countries.  
For knowledge related barriers, the evidence varies. Lack of adequate human capital 
and knowledge about technologies are consistently not significant. This result can be 
interpreted from a comparative perspective. In the context of the recession, it seems that 
asymmetric information on technological opportunities or lack of adequate human capital have 
no significant constraining effect on firms' innovation propensity, whereas lack or uncertainty 
of demand, and lack of finance do. It might be that the UK context is less prone to suffer from 
a shortage of skilled human capital and skills mismatches than stagnant demand and, especially 
in the context of the propensity to introduce incremental (new to the firm) and process 
innovations alongside radical (new to the market) products.  
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Another interesting area for future study would be to examine the differential effect that 
different obstacles have on the introduction of incremental and radical innovation. 
Policymakers should build on this evidence when prioritizing interventions aimed at 
strengthening the innovation capacity of the population of potential innovators, by removing 
or alleviating the obstacles affecting firms who do not manage to translate financial efforts 
devoted to innovation projects, into marketable new products/processes.  
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Figure 1. Selection of the relevant sample: the role of obstacles along the innovation process 
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(9,059) 
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Table 1. Structure of the panel: Full sample and relevant sample (potential innovators)  
       
  
FULL SAMPLE  RELEVANT SAMPLE  
  
Time Obs. N. of firms  % N. of obs. N. of firms  % N. of obs. 
1 17,511 67.36 17,511 14,884 71.58 14,884 
2 5,627 21.64 11,254 4,153 19.97 8,306 
3 2,469 9.50 7,407 1,541 7.41 4,623 
4 390 1.50 1,560 215 1.03 860 
Total 25,997 100 37,732 20,793 100 28,673 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics: mean and standard deviation (overall) in total sample, potential innovators, failed innovators, innovators and non-
innovation oriented firms 
           
  Total Sample Pot. Innovators Failed Innov. Innovators Not Inno. Or.  
 Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Explanatory variables 
ln(Age) 2.88 0.67 2.89 0.66 2.90 0.66 2.88 0.65 2.87 0.70 
Ln(Age sq.) 8.75 3.41 8.76 3.38 8.83 3.39 8.71 3.37 8.70 3.50 
Exporter 0.38 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.31 0.46 0.53 0.50 0.23 0.42 
Higher Education 15.81 25.89 17.57 26.72 13.42 24.01 21.07 28.34 10.21 22.12 
Innovation expenditure (turn)  0.75 1.06 0.91 1.12 0.53 0.85 1.24 1.21 0.24 0.61 
Organization 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.46 0.18 0.39 0.39 0.49 0.08 0.27 
ln (Size) 4.15 1.49 4.21 1.49 4.08 1.45 4.31 1.52 3.99 1.46 
Obstacles to innovation  
Financial obstacles 0.66 0.47 0.87 0.34 0.87 0.33 0.86 0.34 0 0 
Knowledge obstacles 0.60 0.49 0.79 0.41 0.78 0.42 0.81 0.40 0 0 
Market obstacles 0.61 0.49 0.81 0.40 0.80 0.40 0.81 0.40 0 0 
Regulation barriers  0.49 0.50 0.64 0.48 0.65 0.48 0.64 0.48 0 0 
N. of Observation 37,732 28,673 13,097 15,576 9,059 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics: standard deviation (between and within) total sample, potential innovators, failed innovators, innovators and non-
innovation oriented firms 
  Total Sample Pot. Innovators Failed Innov. Innovators Not Inno. Or.  
 St. Dev St. Dev St. Dev St. Dev St. Dev 
 Between Within Between Within Between Within Between Within Between Within 
Explanatory variables 
ln(Age) 0.70 0.08 0.68 0.08 0.67 0.06 0.68 0.07 0.71 0.05 
Ln(Age sq) 3.50 0.39 3.45 0.36 3.44 0.28 3.43 0.32 3.55 0.25 
Exporter 0.47 0.15 0.48 0.14 0.46 0.10 0.49 0.12 0.41 0.09 
High Education 25.22 9.32 26.04 8.71 24.06 6.37 27.90 7.67 21.98 6.05 
Innovation expenditure (turn)  1.03 0.44 1.09 0.43 0.85 0.29 1.19 0.39 0.60 0.19 
Organization 0.40 0.21 0.42 0.21 0.39 0.14 0.46 0.20 0.27 0.08 
ln (Size) 1.45 0.15 1.47 0.14 1.45 0.09 1.50 0.13 1.45 0.10 
Obstacles to innovation  
Financial obstacles 0.44 0.22 0.32 0.16 0.32 0.12 0.33 0.13 0 0 
Knowledge obstacles 0.45 0.23 0.39 0.19 0.40 0.15 0.39 0.15 0 0 
Market obstacles 0.45 0.23 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.46 0.19 0 0 
Regulation barriers  0.46 0.24 0.45 0.22 0.46 0.16 0.46 0.19 0 0 
N. of Observation 37,732 28,673 13,097 15,576 9,059 
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Table 4. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test of the main explanatory variables among 
innovators, failed innovators and non-innovation oriented firms  
       
 
Innovators vs failed 
innovators 
Innovators vs non-
innov. oriented 
Failed inn. vs non-
inn. oriented 
Explanatory variables 
ln(Age) -0.02* 0.01 0.03* 
ln(Age sq.) -0.12* 0.01 0.12* 
Exporter 0.22* 0.30* 0.09* 
High Education 7.65* 10.85* 3.20* 
Innovat. exp (turn)  0.71* 0.99* 0.29* 
Organisation 0.21* 0.31* 0.10* 
ln (Size) 0.23* 0.32* 0.09* 
Notes: Because of the unequal group sample sizes, the significance of the difference in the average level of the explanatory 
variables among the three different groups was evaluated by applying the post hoc pair comparison of mean differences 
(Tukey/Kramer method) (Hinkle et al., 1994). The pairwise comparisons is based upon the studentised range distribution 
(* indicates significance at 5%) 
 
 
Table 5. T-test of the obstacles to innovation variables between innovators and failed innovators  
 Innovators vs failed innovators  
Financial obstacles -0.01** (0.004) 
Knowledge obstacles 0.03*** (0.005) 
Market obstacles 0.01 (0.005) 
Regulation obstacles -0.01** (0.006) 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. T statistics in brackets 
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 Table 6. Probit estimations (marginal effects) of the likelihood of being an innovator (relevant sample and full sample) 
 
 Relevant Sample  Full sample 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Financial Obstacles -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.091***  0.211*** 0.211*** 0.180*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Knowledge Obstacles 0.015 0.015 0.006  0.091*** 0.091*** 0.081*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Market Obstacles -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.049***  0.071*** 0.071*** 0.066*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Regulation obstacles -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.031***  -0.013* -0.013* -0.019** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Exporter 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.121***  0.132*** 0.132*** 0.117*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
High Education 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Organisation 0.234*** 0.234*** 0.206***  0.235*** 0.235*** 0.207*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
ln (Size) 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.030***  0.013*** 0.014*** 0.025*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln(Age) -0.029*** -0.020 -0.004  -0.027*** 0.002 0.010 
 (0.005) (0.031) (0.032)  (0.005) (0.027) (0.028) 
ln(Age squared)  -0.002 -0.002   -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.006) (0.006)   (0.005) (0.005) 
Innovation exp. (turn.)    0.147***    0.147*** 
   (0.005)    (0.004) 
Wald test Year 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald test Reg. 0.005 0.005 0.015  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald test Sect. 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs. 28,673 28,673 28, 673  37,732 37,732 37,732 
Log likelihood -17,576.030 -17,575.984 -16,625.383  -20,210.155 -20,209.553 -19,050.354 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at firm level (calculated 
using the delta method). In all the specifications, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm can be defined as an innovator. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. CIS questionnaire: barriers to innovation  
                  
During the three year period ---- how important were the following factors as constraints on your innovation activities or as an 
influence on the decision to innovate? 
Barrier factors    Barrier items   Factors not experienced 
  
 Degree of importance  
            Low  Med. High  
  
Financial obstacles 
Excessive perceived 
economic risks 
             
      
                   
             
 Direct innovation costs too 
high 
             
      
                   
             
 Cost of finance 
             
      
                   
             
 Availability of finance 
             
      
                   
             
Knowledge 
obstacles 
Lack of qualified personnel 
             
      
                   
               
Lack of information on 
technology 
                     
                                     
Lack of information on 
markets 
                     
                                   
Market obstacles Market dominated by 
established enterprises 
             
     
                                    
Uncertain demand for 
innovative goods or services 
 
               
     
                                    
Regulation obstacles 
Need to meet EU/UK 
Government regulations 
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Table A2. CIS questionnaire: Enterprise with no innovation activity.  
           
If your enterprise had no innovation activities during the three-year period ----, please indicate 
why it was not necessary or possible to innovate: 
   YES   NO 
           
No need due to prior innovation             
           
No need due to market condition            
           
Factor constraining innovation             
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Table A3. CIS questionnaire (innovation output questions)   
           
 We qualify as innovative those firms that responded positively to at least one of the following questions: 
           
   YES   NO 
1.    During the three-year period -----, did your enterprise introduce:          
 
 New or significantly improved goods. (Exclude the simple resale of 
new goods purchased from other enterprises and changes of a purely 
cosmetic nature) 
  
       
           
  
       
 New or significantly improved services            
           
2.    During the three-year period -----, did your enterprise introduce any new 
or significantly improved processes for producing or supplying products 
(goods or services) which were new to your enterprise? 
         
           
         
           
3.    During the three-year period -----, did your enterprise introduce any new 
or significantly improved processes for producing or supplying products 
(goods or services) which were new to your industry? 
         
           
         
           
4.    During the three-year period -----, did your enterprise undertake any 
innovation activities to develop product or process innovations that you had 
to abandon or which were ongoing at the end of 2004? 
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Table A4 Sectoral composition and average employment - full sample and potential innovators  
  Full Sample Pot. Innovators 
  N Av. Em. N Av. Em. 
Manufac. of food products 1,210 348 1,053 377 
Manufac. of textiles 333 117 273 127 
Manufac. of wearing apparel 173 66 139 68 
Manufac. of leather and leather products 41 96 38 92 
Manufac. of wood and cork (exc. furniture) 455 77 368 87 
Manufac. of paper and paper products 346 146 288 159 
Manufac. of print materials and reproduction of recorded media 1,011 171 841 184 
Manufac. of coke, refined petroleum  20 349 17 388 
Manufac. of chemicals and chemical products 470 311 430 311 
Manufac. of rubber and plastic products/refined petroleum 860 147 741 154 
Manufac. of other metallic mineral products  432 200 348 213 
Manufac. of basic metals 229 264 184 297 
Manufac. of fabricated metal products  1,728 68 1,354 75 
Manufac. of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1,090 158 953 163 
Manufac. of computer electronic and optical products 86 229 73 224 
Manufac. of electrical equipment 626 157 538 170 
Manufac. of radio, TV and communications equipment 312 196 292 203 
Manufac. of medical and optical instruments  588 134 536 140 
Manufac. of motor vehicles, trailers 647 258 560 264 
Manufac. of other transport equipment 342 486 269 524 
Manufac. of furniture 1,013 99 869 107 
Recycling 183 74 142 84 
Wholesale retail and repair of motor vehicles 1,209 286 764 287 
Wholesale trade except motor vehicle 2,517 232 1,910 221 
Retail trade except motor vehicles  3,127 584 2,028 694 
Hotels and similar accommodation 2,535 515 1,648 643 
Transport, storage, communications 1,669 219 1,178 248 
Water transport 69 148 46 160 
Air transport 51 555 36 685 
Transport support activities  942 282 678 278 
Post and telecommunications 693 298 546 353 
Financial services activities except insurance  329 605 254 730 
Insurance reinsurance and pension funds  162 559 135 531 
Activities auxiliary to financial services  943 188 721 202 
Real estate activities 1,451 184 935 212 
Renting of machinery and equipment 795 133 555 149 
Computer programming and consultancy  1,313 226 1,176 236 
Scientific research and development 573 142 501 147 
Other business activities 6,912 375 5,083 375 
Sewage and refuse disposal 34 64 30 48 
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 213 40 143 45 
 37,732 289 28,673 304 
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Table A5 Sectoral composition and average employment: Failed innovators, innovators and non-innovation oriented 
firms  
 
Innovators Failed Innov Not Inno. Or. 
  
N 
Av. 
Em. 
N 
Av. 
Em. 
N 
Av. 
Em. 
Manufac. of food products 692 446 361 245 157 151 
Manufac. of textiles 162 151 111 92 60 73 
Manufac. of wearing apparel/leather 115 82 70 93 37 85 
Manufac. of wood and cork (ecx. furniture) 195 108 173 65 87 35 
Manufac. of paper and paper products 167 174 121 138 58 82 
Manufac. of print. Mater. and reproduction of rec. media 491 195 350 170 170 103 
Manufac. of chemicals and chemical prod 341 334 89 223 40 320 
Manufac. of rubber and plastic products/refined petrol. 512 202 246 390 122 112 
Manufac. of other metallic mineral products  217 247 131 156 84 148 
Manufac. of basic metals 102 375 82 199 45 133 
Manufac. of fabricated metal products  714 86 640 62 374 45 
Manufac. of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 626 196 327 98 137 125 
Manufac. of computer electronic and optical products 60 258 13 65 13 257 
Manufac. of electrical equipment 371 201 167 102 88 75 
Manufac. of radio, TV and communications equipment 229 221 63 139 20 95 
Manufac. of medical and optical instruments  423 159 113 69 52 70 
Manufac. of motor vehicles, trailers 355 312 205 181 87 221 
Manufac. of other transport equipment 165 750 104 165 73 345 
Manufac. of furniture 532 117 337 91 144 55 
Recycling 70 94 72 74 41 41 
Wholesale retail and repair of motor vehicles 282 319 482 268 445 284 
Wholesale trade except motor vehicle 982 263 928 176 607 268 
Retail trade except motor vehicles  770 1194 1,258 388 1,099 380 
Hotels and similar accommodation 655 876 993 489 887 276 
Transport, storage, communications 395 332 783 206 491 148 
Water transport 26 146 20 179 23 125 
Air transport 17 1111 19 303 15 243 
Transport support activities 328 283 350 273 264 291 
Post and telecommunications 317 375 229 321 147 94 
Financial services activities except insurance  174 948 80 256 75 179 
Insurance reinsurance and pension funds  88 712 47 192 27 702 
Activities auxiliary to financial services  407 274 314 109 222 141 
Real estate activities 400 278 535 163 516 134 
Renting of machinery and equipment 230 202 325 112 240 96 
Computer programming and consultancy 918 217 258 303 137 145 
Scientific research and development 400 161 101 92 72 104 
Other business activities 2,558 409 2,525 341 1,829 376 
Sewage and refuse disposal 90 50 75 37 74 185 
  15,576 353 13,097 246 9,059 242 
Notes: Due to the paucity of observations, for confidentiality reasons, figures referring to the ‘Recreational, cultural and 
sporting activities, sector are not reported.  
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Table A6. The variables: acronyms and definitions. 
  
 
Variables identifying the different sub-samples of firms according to our definitions 
 
Potential innovators 
Dummy =1 if firm is a potential innovator (whether it has engaged 
in innovation activities and/or has experienced any barrier to 
innovation activities during the 3-year period), and 0 otherwise. 
Innovators 
Dummy =1 if firm has introduced new or significantly improved 
products/processes or has any innovation activities that had 
abandoned or which were ongoing at the end of the 3-year period, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Failed Innovators 
Dummy =1 if firm wanted to innovate, but did not manage to do so 
because of barriers to innovation activity during the 3-year period, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Not-Innovation Oriented  
Dummy =1 if firm has no innovative activities and did not 
experience any barriers to innovation during the 3-year period, and 
0 otherwise. 
Explanatory variables 
ln (Age) Natural logarithm of firm age. 
Exporter 
Dummy =1 if the firm has traded in an international market during 
the 3-year period, and 0 otherwise. 
High education  
Ratio of highly educated personnel in total employment (figures 
refer to the last year in each of the 3-year periods).  
Innovative exp. (turn) 
Total amount of the firm’s investment in innovation activity 
normalised by total turnover.   
Organization 
Dummy=1 if the firm has implemented major changes to its 
organisational structure (e.g. introduction of cross-functional 
teams, outsourcing of major business functions) during the 3-year 
period, and 0 otherwise. 
ln (Size) 
Log of the total number of the firm’s employees (figures refer to the 
last year in each of the 3-year periods).  
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Table A6 (continued). The variables: acronyms and definitions. 
 
 
Obstacles to innovation 
Excessive perceived 
economic risks 
Dummy=1 if the firm faced excessive perceived economic risks during 
the 3-year period, and 0 otherwise. 
Too high innovation 
costs 
Dummy=1 if the firm faced too high innovation costs, and 0 otherwise. 
Costs of finance  Dummy=1 if the cost of finance was an obstacle, and 0 otherwise. 
Availability of finance 
Dummy=1 if the firm was deterred by the availability of finance, and 0 
otherwise. 
Lack of qualified 
personnel  
Dummy=1 if the firm was deterred by lack of qualified personnel, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Lack of information on 
technology 
Dummy=1 if the firm faced a lack of information on technology and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Lack of information on 
markets 
Dummy=1 if the firm faced a lack of information on markets, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Market dominated by 
established enterprises 
Dummy=1 if the firm was faced with a market dominated by established 
enterprises, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Uncertain demand for 
innovative goods or 
services 
Dummy=1 if the firm faced uncertain demand for innovative goods or 
services, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Regulation obstacles 
Dummy=1 if the firm saw regulation as an obstacle to innovation, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
